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We contribute to the debate on the interpretation of investment-cash flow sensitivities by
including uncertainty measures in both a simple theoretical investment model and an
empirical illustration for Dutch firm-level data. Using a slightly modified version of the
Kaplan-Zingales (1997) model we show that it is likely that firms facing high uncertainty
rely more on cash flow. Next we illustrate this result using an investment panel data
model of Dutch listed firms. Using a threshold estimator we determine the critical level
of stock price, sales, and employment uncertainty. Next we apply a GMM-estimator to
correct for the endogeneity of the regressors. The empirical results confirm the notion
that higher uncertainty intensifies the use of cash flow.




The recent literature on investment modeling emphasizes the role of both (real and
financial) imperfections and uncertainty in investment decisions. There is attention for
adjustment costs and (ir)reversibilities, imperfect competition on product markets, a lack
of information on financial markets, all possibly combined with the presence of
uncertainty of the selling price, sales itself, stock prices, etc. Both the theoretical
literature and the empirical equivalent argue that at least some of the relations seem to be
nonlinear. One can think of the lumpy adjustment cost functions (see Hamermesh and
Pfann, 1996), the impact of uncertainty on irreversible investment (Sarkar, 2000), the
differential impact of financial constraints on investment (Whited, 1992), etc. The
complexity of the nonlinearities, however, prevents widespread empirical research. Here
one can think of the rather problematic empirical implementation of the nowadays
popular real options model (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
Our paper investigates a  very simple investment model, inspired by the financial market
imperfection literature. We analyze the historical investment-cash flow model, wherein
the major notion is the upward sloping supply curve of financial means with internal
resources as the cheapest funds (see Duesenberry, 1958). This model is popularized by
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) using micro-economic data. Since 1988 many
empirical studies analyzed the cash-flow sensitivity of investment (see Lensink et al,
2001 for a review) and many others have criticized both the theoretical notions as well as
the empirical findings (see Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). In this paper we certainly do not
pretend to solve all the problems related to investment-cash flow models. In fact one
might argue that we add even a few more. Our main contribution to the literature is the
inclusion of uncertainty in investment-cash flow models and a preliminary analysis of the
impact uncertainty is believed to have. Including uncertainty in investment-cash flow
models is very much inspired by the real options literature. Our approach however is far
more eclectic and loose than the rather prescriptive option valuation models. We start
from a few very simple descriptive observations, where we show that firms that face
higher uncertainty (no matter what the source of the uncertainty might be) experience
higher cash-flow uncertainty elasticity’s (see Figure 1 as a first clue). Our main concern
3therefore is whether we come up with a consistent theoretical explanation of this finding.
And if so, whether we can go a little further than pure descriptive statistics in analyzing
this rather unexplored phenomenon.
Why would firms that face large uncertainty be more cash-flow dependent? In line with
FHP it is easy to point at financial distress. Firms that face a large demand uncertainty
could be confronted with a large external financing premium, such that they are
constrained in obtaining external funds and are forced to rely on internal wealth. This
might as well be untrue however, because unconstrained firms might use their cash flow
rightaway for seemingly profitable investment projects knowing that they are able to
attract external funds at any time (this is an argument in line with Cleary, 1999). Almeida
and Campello (2001) argue that if current investment is seen as collateral for future
borrowing and shocks to internal wealth affect current investment, firms that are less
constrained will borrow more. So less constrained firms are more sensitive to cash flow
through the amplification affect of collateral. It might also be true that management
demonstrates  risk averse decisions in using internally generated funds instead of asking
the bank for a new loan, without being a firm that would be financially constrained.
Hines and Thaler (1995) suggest that non-optimizing behavior by managers might also
lead to a higher degree of cash flow sensitivity of investment. If management behaves
relatively less-optimizing for high uncertainties, it might use more cash flow for
financing investment. So there are multiple explanations of the same empirical
phenomenon we are presenting.
How do we proceed? First we start with a simple theoretical model of the investment-
cash flow relation. Our model is a simple extension of the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) model.
We add two types of uncertainty to the KZ-model: uncertainty with respect to Return on
Investment (ROI) and the wedge between the costs of external and internal funds. We
analyze this model under risk aversion of managers (with risk neutrality as a simple
benchmark case). In fact we analyze whether we can find clues for the two main
arguments in this discussion: the financial imperfections (or FHP-) hypothesis, or the risk
attitude of managers. We show that the KZ-model that allows for uncertainty indeed hints
4at a higher cash-flow sensitivity for firms that have a more risk averse management, or a
firm that faces higher uncertainty. These results don’t provide any serious tools in
identifying empirical relations, but do suggest that looking for the role of uncertainty in
models like this is justified.
Next we proceed to analyze the impact of uncertainty empirically. We use data on 96
Dutch listed firms during the sample 1985-1997. We propose to estimate a simple
threshold model, where the threshold variable is implemented by uncertainty measures.
Following Hansen (1999) we indeed find that high uncertainty leads to larger cash-flow
elasticities. The major advantage of the Hansen-approach is that the estimates of the
thresholds are conditional on the model specification as a whole. The major disadvantage
is that the Hansen-procedure in fact resembles a simple Least Squares strategy, not
allowing for endogeneity of the regressors. Since this seems a too restrictive assumption
we analyze the results further using a Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM)
estimator. The results obtained here again confirm the existence of different regimes of
uncertainty affecting the cash-flow sensitivity of investment. We summarize and
conclude at the end.
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What type of models are known to analyze the impact of financial variables on
investment decisions? As Chirinko (1993) argues one might use q-models or estimate the
Euler-conditions directly. Fazzari et al. (1988) estimate a q-model and add cash-flow,
while Whited (1992) estimates an Euler-condition and adds debt constraints. In this paper
we analyze the former class taking the very simple one-period Kaplan-Zingales (1997)
model. The Kaplan-Zingales model assumes a deterministic setting (so the risk attitude of
the decision-maker is unimportant). They show that the FHP-conclusions on the
interpretation of cash-flow sensitivities can’t be based on this simple one-period model.
The monotonicty of the marginal investment-internal wealth relation, implicitly assumed
to be negative by FHP, can’t be assumed in general terms. We depart from the Kaplan-
Zingales model by assuming a stochastic world and risk aversion of the decision-maker.
5There are many reasons to believe that a manager will behave risk averse, but probably
the fear of losing the job is the most prominent one.
We have a manager that derives utility of making profits (Π ) according to the
exponential utility function Π=Π α )( . The coefficient of absolute risk aversion
(CARA) is α−=
$
  (and 0>α , risk neutrality corresponds to 0=α ). The manager will











where 2Πσ is the variance of profits. We model profits by
 −−−=Π ),()( µλ
The profit function is similar to the one used by  Kaplan-Zingales (1997). The difference
is that we have added a stochastic term λ in the production function  and a stochastic
term µ  in the cost function  λ represents the uncertainty in real returns on investment;
µ represents the stochastic nature of the costs of attracting external funds. We assume:
		 [ ] [ ] 1== µλ 

  and [ ]2λσ 
=  and [ ]2µρ 
=
Note that we use the property that the variance of λ is equal to the variance of the simple
deterministic transformation λ +1. 	is investment. In line with the original Kaplan-
Zingales model, it is assumed that:
  	 01 > ,  011 <
Investment can be financed with internal funds  or external funds 
	This implies that  
			
 The opportunity cost of internal funds is the cost of capital , which is assume
6to be equal to 1. The additional costs of external funds is given by a function ),( 
 µ ,
where 	is a measure of a firm’s wedge between the internal and external cost of funds.
Because of information or agency problems the use of external funds generates a
deadweight cost, which is borne by the issuing firm. The total cost of raising external
funds increases with the amount of funds raised and in the extent of agency or
information problem. We assume:
 (	 01 > ;  02 > ; 		and .
For ease of computation, we assume that we can write:
 )	 )()(  λλ =  and ),(),(  −=− µµ .
Assumption 	) implies that we can disembed uncertainty. In case both uncertainty
terms are uncorrelated ( 0][ =λµ
 ) we can derive the variance of profits:
[ ] [ ] 2222222 ),()(),()( 

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Proof:
The first-order condition for optimal investment reads:
( )[ ] ( )[ ]),(1)( 11 

 −++=− αρµασλ
Total differentiation of this condition, ignoring , gives:
7( )[ ] ( ) [ ]

 −+=− 1111 αρµασλ
The sensitivity of investment to internal wealth, for given 	(note that

























In the case of perfect capital markets )		 , because *+ = 0. But,  with imperfect
capital markets, and using *,  )			Note that this holds for a risk-averse and a
risk neutral manager ( 0>α and 0=α , respectively). 
,
-
The result of proposition 1 shows that for either low risk aversion (small α) or relatively
small uncertainty with respect to the real returns on investment (small σ) we find the
familiar positive relation between investment and internal wealth. For rather large risk
aversion and/or relatively large real returns uncertainty this relation might become
negative. Although interesting the )-relation is not of real importance in itself. We
are interested in the sensitivity of this relation with respect to changes in uncertainty and
in the monotonicity over changes in internal wealth.
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Proof
The effect of an increase in return on investment uncertainty and external cost uncertainty
































It is immediate clear that for the risk-neutral manager ( 0=α ) both derivatives are 0.
,
-
The result of proposition 2 is rather crucial to explain our empirical findings in Figure 1.
Indeed, risk averse managers tend to rely more on internal wealth, no matter what the
initial relation between investment and internal wealth was, if uncertainty (either return
on investment or cost uncertainty) increases. Proposition 2 also shows that uncertainty
with respect to external financing costs will increase the marginal impact of return
uncertainty. If firms have a rather high external cost uncertainty it is likely that also the
mean costs of external finance will be high. This indeed leads to the FHP-hypothesis:
firms that are likely to be affected by new finance restrictions will rely more on internal
finance.
Kaplan and Zingales remark that the usual practice of comparing the investment-cash
flow sensitivities across groups of firms corresponds to looking at differences in )	as
a function of internal wealth . This approach is only useful if the sensitivity of
investment to cash flow ()) decreases when a firm’s availability of internal wealth
increases. In other words )	should be negative. Kaplan and Zingales, using their
deterministic one period model, argue that for a quadratic cost function and a production
function with a positive third derivative this is not the case. Hence, when financial
constraints become more severe, the sensitivity to cash flow does not necessarily
increase. In this way, they severely criticize the FHP-methodology of comparing various
subgroups of firms and the differential role cash flow plays. The question now is whether
the Kaplan-Zingales critique also holds for a risk-averse manager in a stochastic setting.






In addition, we assume:








In order to calculate )/	we make use of the result that if H(W,I)=0 and I=f(W) is a
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So it is clear that for a negative 	(that is ασ) the first term between brackets can turn
positive.  In that case the numerator of the second term is negative. The denominator will
be negative for not too negative values of A, which gives the upper bound. ,
-
Note that under risk neutrality,  and we get the original Kaplan-Zingales case. Note
also that, in line with Kaplan and Zingales, we need to make assumptions regarding the
production function and the cost function in order to justify the FHP analysis. Kaplan and
Zingales show that for   >0  and  =0, the monotonicity does not hold anymore. In
our case, using 	,	 the FHP analysis still holds even if   >0  and  =0.
So proposition 3 tells us that in case of large uncertainty and especially relatively large











if return on investment uncertainty σ or cost of external funds uncertainty ρ increase? Is









































Take the derivatives of the first and second term with respect to 







































































So an increase in σ is likely to favor the monotonicity, but an increase in ρ will do the
reverse.
Concluding, in this section we obtained the following results. First, for a risk-averse
manager, an increase in (both return on investment and cost) uncertainty leads to an
increase in the internal funds sensitivity of investment. Second, a stochastic version of the
Kaplan-Zingales model does not give general  insights regarding the monotonicity of the
derivative ). But we are able to characterize cases, where the monotonicity is likely
to exist: the cases of large risk aversion combined with relatively large cost uncertainty.
In the remainder of the paper we will empirically test whether firms that face higher
degrees of uncertainty indeed display higher internal funds sensitivities. The second
conclusion reminds us on the fact that by comparing internal funds sensitivities of
different groups of firms may not automatically be explained in terms of external
financial constraints. Before explaining the estimation technique, the next section
describes the data we have used.
3. .
During the period 1990 up to and including 1997 about 150 firms were listed on the
Amsterdam Stock Exchange. From these firms we take the non-financial firms and
remove some firms that have exceptional accounting systems (like Royal Dutch Shell,
which publishes its accounts both in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands). This
gives a raw set of 112 firms for the period 1985-2000. The coverage of the data for the
starting years of the sample and the most recent years is not complete. Moreover, we use
a moving average for some variables. Finally we need a balanced set of data in one of our
regression models. This confines the final data to 96 firms over 1990-1997. This set is
representative for the Dutch non-financial manufacturing sector. It is good to note that
Dutch listed firms are known for their international orientation (the major reason being
the Dutch economy a very open relatively small economy).
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The data are taken from the source REACH, which is operated by the Belgian company
Bureau Van Dijk. Bureau van Dijk publishes a European equivalent AMADEUS, which
holds information on both listed and non-listed firms. REACH is the Dutch subset of
AMADEUS and includes more than 10 thousand Dutch firms. Our main argument to take
the listed firms is twofold. First, the way of accounting financial results is comparable
among listed firms, but typically different for non-listed firms. Secondly, we are
interested in the impact of stock price volatility on firm investment.
From the balance sheet and profit and loss account we construct the following variables:





 financial expense (interest rate payments);
 capital expenditure (as denoted by the firm) in material fixed assets;
4 material fixed assets;
5 liquid assets;
5- long-term debt;





 working capital: short-term assets minus short-term liabilities.
Moreover we include information on:
-7 dividend per share;

69 the number of people employed;
2:2 the highest stock price during the year;
5; the lowest stock price during the year.
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Using these raw data series we transform the series into the usual variables )4, )4,
etc. Moreover we use the following definitions:
-	<*8-5-+)$ debt-to-assets ratio;
- <-)4 depreciation rate






)*8-5-+ implicit interest rate paid;
:85 annual growth rate of sales;
6>67)
, market-to-book ratio;
;<*&-+)$ return on assets;
;
<*&-+
 return on equity;
		=$

8$-   user cost of capital (raw approximation);

,7;5		<*2:2&5;+)5; stock price volatility;
857;5  volatility of sales, measured by a 7-year window
coefficient of variation of sales;

697;5 volatility of employees (see measurement 857;5)
<insert Table 1 about here>
Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics of the variables used. The figures represent
averages (medians) of firm’ averages (medians) over the years. So we first average over
the years per firm and take averages of the average firm observations (and medians of
medians to be precise). Table 1 shows that the data are not seriously skewed, since the
mean and median values coincide to some extent. The first panel gives the major
investment data. The average ratio of capital expenditure to the stock of material fixed
assets is a little over 20 per cent. Cash flow as a percentage of the fixed capital stock is
almost 40 per cent. This implies that the free cash flow (cash flow minus capital
expenditure) is about 18 per cent on average. Most of the firms hold a relative large
14
proportion of equity to fixed assets. On average the amount of working capital is also
relatively large. During the 1990-1997 period most firms had a rather high market-to-
book ratio. Leverage decreased in the Netherlands since 1985. Most listed firms tried to
restore their solvability and succeeded in doing so. The average paid interest rate on
short- and long-term debt is a little under 4 per cent. The raw measure of the user cost of
capital (equal to the interest rate plus the rate of depreciation is about 20 per cent.
Stock price volatility is relatively large. Here we note that our measure of volatility (high
minus low) is rather sensitive to shocks in equity prices. Introspection of the data
however reveals that the high-lows are the result of a rather large volatility during the
whole sample period. For the other measures of volatility, from which we will not use the
dividend volatility, the coefficients of variation have rather modest means (median
values) of about 20 per cent.
For our purpose it is good to describe the uncertainty measures more precisely. Table 2
gives the correlation matrix. This matrix shows that the stock price volatility is rather
uncorrelated with the other measures. Sales and employee volatility correlate rather
strongly.
<insert Table 2 about here>
A natural way to describe the data is the use of scatterplots of investment, cash flow and
uncertainty and search for some non-linearity. Here we proceed as follows. First we
estimate our base reference model. We regress )4 on Market-to-Book (6>), the change
in working capital (*+)4*&+), lagged sales (8*&+)4*&+), the lagged investment ratio
(*&+)4*&?+) and an intercept. We use the residuals from this equation as the
“conditioned” investment data. Next we scatter these residuals with cash flow ()4*&+)
for low and high volatility separately. This gives us the first impression of the properties
of the data.
<insert figure 1 about here>
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Figure 1 gives the results for the stock price volatility. The left panel shows the
observations with stock price volatility below the median value, the right-hand panel the
observations with stock price volatility above the median value. On the vertical axis we
plot the residuals of the simple OLS equation and on the horizontal axis the variable
)4*&+ The line represents a local linear Kernel fit. We did not trim the observations
for outliers and note that the scale is different on both axes. Figures 2 and 3 give similar
plots for low- and high sales and employment volatility. All the figures give the similar
impression: the investment-cash flow sensitivity is higher for higher volatilities. Stock
price plots are the least convincing in this respect due to the special shape of the low-
volatility line.
<insert figures 2 and 3 about here>
The descriptive statistics point at differences with respect to investment-cash-flow
sensitivities between regimes of low and high volatility. What could be an explanation? If
we follow Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 1999) and assume that managerial risk aversion
would be the main cause of a large cash-flow dependence of internal wealth one would
indeed expect to see high-cash flow sensitivities in volatile situations. But the same holds
for the Fazzari-Hubbard-Petersen (1988) hypothesis of external financing trouble. It is
likely that in periods of high uncertainty it will be harder to attract external funds,
therefore firms would be forced to use relatively more internal funds.
) /	
The descriptive data section shows that investment, cash flow and uncertainty are
interrelated. In this section we explore this relation a bit further. The main argument
made relates to the endogeneity of the cut-off rate of uncertainty. In the descriptive
section we took the median values of the volatility variables. Here we integrate the cut-
off level into the model. In order to analyze this problem we propose to estimate a
threshold regression models for  ,,1=  firms and $ ,,1=  observations of the
following form:
16









− 21, 1,0=A (3)
where = represents net capital expenditure, 4 the beginning-of-period capital stock, @  is
the vector of regime-independent (or control) variables, such as cash flow;  is the
regime dependent variable (cash flow as a percentage of the beginning-of-period capital
stock); α , 1β , and 2β  are (vectors of) parameters; and the error term LWε  is iid with mean
zero and finite variance.6 The threshold variable 7	is the uncertainty variable and θ  is the
threshold value to be estimated, which does not depend on the firm or the year indicator. 
is the indicator function, which has the value one if the argument is true and zero
otherwise. The threshold variable defines two regimes: a low uncertainty regime with
θ≤
LW
7  and a high uncertainty regime with θ>
LW
7 . Based on the predictions of the
standard cash flow model, we expect that when uncertainty is below the threshold, the
cash-flow elasticity of capital expenditure is low and hence the firm is probably investing
less than proportionally. But if uncertainty exceeds the threshold, the cash-flow
sensitivity of investment increases. This suggests that the estimated coefficients for 1β
and 2β  are expected to differ. In other words, cash flow may have different effects on
firm investment depending on the magnitude of the volatility effect.
The empirical model is estimated by conditional least squares. To that purpose the
observations are sorted on the threshold variable and the sums of squared residuals are
computed for all values of the threshold variable. The optimal value of the threshold
variable is the value that minimizes the sum of squared residuals. The optimal parameter
estimates are the estimated α’s and β’s that belong to this optimal threshold value. An
important question is whether the threshold regression model of equation (3) is
statistically significant to its linear counterpart, which has the null hypothesis 2:
21 ββ = . In this situation the threshold parameter is not defined under the null hypothesis.
This makes the testing problem complex. However, Hansen (1996) shows that
asymptotically valid p-values can be constructed by bootstrapping.
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Valid confidence intervals for the threshold parameter can be based on the likelihood
ratio (or ) statistic ( ) ( )( ) 2ˆˆ)( σθθθ 885 −= , which tests the null hypothesis 2: θθ ˆ= .
Here ( )θ8  is the sum of squared errors of the estimated threshold regression when the
threshold parameter equals , ( )θˆ8  is the sum of squared residuals belonging to the
optimal threshold parameter θˆ  and 2σˆ  is the residual variance belonging to the optimal
threshold parameter θˆ . The likelihood ratio statistic is equal to zero at θθ ˆ= . Confidence
intervals for the threshold parameter can be constructed by inverting the distribution
function of the likelihood ratio statistic. A graphical method to find the confidence
interval of the threshold parameter is to plot the likelihood ratio statistic ( )θ5  against all
values of θ	and to check for which values of θ	crosses the horizon line that shows the
confidence level of the test. Confidence intervals of the other parameters in the threshold
regression, the α’s and β’s can be approximated by the conventional normal
approximation as if the threshold estimate θˆ  were the true value.
A few empirical choices have to be made. First, we need to decide on the choice of the
control variables. Here we follow closely Houston and James (2001) by taking:
1. 6>: the market-to-book value of equity. This variable is theoretically less
appealing than Tobin’s Q, but can be measured quite precisely on the contrary.
There is whatsoever no information on the market value of debt, which
troubles any specification of Q;
? 8*&+)4*&+: lagged sales over capital. This variable might signal any
(	 	 ''	 %((	 %3 !	 *	 2(	 	 B/
?+C
3. (+)4*&+D cash flow might have a simple other destiny: the change of
working capital. This variable competes with capital expenditure;
4. 5,)4*&+D the stock of liquid assets gives an indication of the availability of
short-term funds.
The second empirical choice relates to the choice of the uncertainty measures. We use
three: stock price volatility (
,7;5), sales volatility (857;5) and employment
18
volatility	*
697;5). The first two measures are widely used in empirical studies on the
investment-uncertainty relation. The employment volatility measure is less used. This
variable might represent the uncertainty the firm faces with respect to attracting or firing
possibilities of workers.
We are not so much interested in the fit of the linear model, so we don’t report the results
of the linear model in detail. It is good to note that the Hansen estimation method is fixed
effects method. We include moreover time dummies (but don’t report the estimation
results). Table 4 presents the results. Table 4 illustrates the effect we observed in the
descriptive statistics: the cash-flow parameter for high volatility observations is about
three times bigger than the corresponding parameter for low volatility. This conclusion
holds for the three measures of volatility. The table also gives an indication of the
likelihood of a second threshold. For all models the improvement of the fit with a double
threshold is not convincing.
<insert Table 4 about here>
* 0##	
It is well-known that estimates of investment equations may suffer from endogeneity
problems. Moreover, there may exist measurement errors of the explanatory variables
that have to be taken into account. The use of an instrumental variable estimation
technique may come around these problems. However, the ordinary least squares
technique is used for the threshold estimates, and so may be subject to the
abovementioned problems. Therefore, this section presents investment estimates using an
instrumental variable approach (the system GMM estimator). In these estimates, we use
information about the threshold values for the uncertainty measures as determined in the
previous section. Ideally, the threshold should also be determined using the GMM
routine. However, as yet there is no software available which can do that. So, we leave
this to further research.
19
We estimate different investment models with the system generalized methods of
moments (GMM) estimator, using a new version of DPD98 for Gauss (Arellano and
Bond, 1998). The system GMM estimator combines the differenced equation with a
levels equation to form a system GMM. Lagged levels are used as instruments for the
contemporaneous differences and lagged differences as instruments for the
contemporaneous levels.  We adopt the system GMM estimation procedure since first
difference GMM may suffer from weak instruments problems (Blundell and Bond
(1998)). The coefficients we present, as well as the p-values, refer to two step GMM
estimates, based on robust, finite sample corrected standard errors (Windmeijer, 2000).
Note that the not corrected two-step standard errors are severely biased for small samples.
Therefore, most researchers present coefficients and standard errors based on one-step
estimates. Windmeijer (2000) shows how the two step standard estimates can be
corrected, and that is the approach we have followed.2 In all estimations we control for
time effects by adding time dummies for 1990-1997. These time dummies are used as
additional instruments.
The reliability of the system GMM estimation procedure depends very much on the
validity of the instruments. We consider the validity of the instruments by presenting a
Sargan test. The Sargan test is a test on overidentifying restrictions. It is asymptotically
distributed as χ2 and tests the null hypothesis of validity of the (overidentifying)
instruments. P-values report the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis, so
that a P value above 0.05 implies that the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null is
above 0.05. In this case, a higher P-value makes it more likely that the instruments are
valid. We also test the reliability of the instruments of the level equation by presenting
the Difference Sargan test.3 The Difference Sargan test is also asymptotically distributed
as χ2 and tests the null hypothesis of validity of the (overidentifying) instruments in the
level equation. So, the levels equations instruments are not rejected if the calculated value
of the Difference Sargan test is lower than the theoretical value of  a χ2  variable with 
degrees of freedom.
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The consistency of the estimates also depends on the absence of serial correlation in the
error terms. This will be the case if the differenced residuals display significant negative
first order serial correlation and no second order serial correlation. We present tests for
first-order and second-order serial correlation related to the estimated residuals in first
differences.  The tests are asymptotically distributed as standard normal variables. The
null hypothesis here relates to “insignificance” so that a low P-value for the test on first-
order serial correlation and a high P-value for the test on second-order serial correlation
suggests that the disturbances are not serially correlated.
The equations we estimate have the same structure as presented in the previous section.
The main difference is that here we do not endogenously determine the threshold, but use
the threshold value to determine an indicator function with value 1 for the low volatility
regime and 0 for the high volatility regime.4 This indicator function is used to determine
two cash flow variables, one for the high volatility regime and one for the low volatility
regime. The estimates are presented in Table 5.
<insert Table 5 about here>
Although coefficient values differ for the threshold estimates and the GMM estimates,
the main message remains: the cash flow coefficient is much higher for the high volatility
regime than for the low volatility regime. This holds for all volatility measures used in
the estimates. Note that the estimates without a lagged independent variable suffer from
second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Therefore, we have also
presented estimates in which the lagged dependent variable is added as an additional
regressor. For these estimates, there is no evidence for serial correlation. Moreover, the
Sargan and the Difference Sargan test suggest  that the instruments are valid.  Most
importantly, also for the estimates with the lagged dependent variable, the cash flow




Our basic conclusion is that uncertainty and managers’ responses to it can shed some
light on the troubled investment-cash-flow relations. We show that it is likely that risk-
averse managers confronted by a large degree of uncertainty will rely relatively more on
cash flow to finance investment. We illustrate this in a slightly adjusted version of the
Kaplan-Zingales (1997) model and an empirical illustration using Dutch panel data. The
role to cash flow in investment equations we propose is not  the ultimate proof of the
identification of financial imperfections though. Our adjustment of the Kaplan-Zingales
illustrates that for risk averse decision making there are plausible cases of relative return
on investment and external cost uncertainty that turn the Fazzari-Hubbard-Petersen
hypothesis relevant. These cases are no general conclusions though. Moreover, our model
also supports the idea that the risk attitude of the decision maker (and not financial
imperfections) make cash flow a determinant of current investment.
Our empirical illustrations show that for 96 Dutch listed firms investment depends more
on cash flow for high uncertainty cases. We estimate two model versions:  a threshold
least squares model to determine the threshold values for the uncertainty variables and
next a more elaborated model that allows for endogenity of the regressors. Both
illustrations support the theoretical notion presented in the first part of our paper.
There are still some open ends to our analysis. First, our theoretical model is a simple
one-period model that does not include any strategic response to e.g. demand or price
uncertainty. Secondly, our empirical work would be stronger if we were able to combine
our threshold estimation with the GMM-routine. Ideally we would like to determine the
threshold values conditional on the endogenity of the regressors. Thirdly, we illustrate the
model for a small open economy. It would be valuable to analyze other datasets
(previously used for the analysis of the FHP-hypothesis) to determine whether our
propositions hold in general terms.
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/	 – Desciptive statistics
# ! #
 24.40 16.97 19.10
	 42.18 16.38 33.55

 138.44 34.91 110.75
 75.21 30.54 45.06
 3.51 27.29 2.04
 42.39 19.72 12.13
	

	 17.78 21.09 11.17
 665.98 148.85 427.61
 2.45 1.46 1.53
 53.13 5.83 53.65


 3.84 1.24 4.14
 17.36 3.40 15.84
 21.20 3.93 19.69
 9.94 3.89 9.42

 13.12 28.81 14.11
 6.16 14.42 7.48

 60.20 33.85 43.92
 21.56 8.09 19.21

 18.80 8.33 15.60
Note: see main text for an explanation of the symbols used.
Source: REACH (Bureau van Dijk, 2001).
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/	  – Correlation matrix of the volatility variables.
  

 1 0.164 0.111
 0.164 1 0.639

 0.111 0.639 1
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Low stock price volatility High stock price volatility
(EQVOL<median) (EQVOL>median)























Kernel Fit (Epanechnikov, h= 128.63)
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Low sales volatility High sales volatility
(SALVOL<median) (SALVOL>median)


























Kernel Fit (Epanechnikov, h= 128.63)
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Low employment volatility High employment volatility
(EMPVOL<median) (EMPVOL>median)































































































LR(2) 25.43 11.25 12.74
Standard-errors between parentheses. *+ gives the parameter estimate of the low-
volatility regime, *?+ gives the parameter estimate of the high-volatility regime, LR(1)
denotes the likelihood-ratio test for the single threshold effect, LR(2) denotes the
likelihood ratio of the double threshold effect, SSR() denotes the sum of squared
residuals of the model with 	thresholds. Time-dummies not reported. Confidence
intervals based on 300 bootstrap-replications.
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Standard-errors between parentheses; p-values between brackets. Sargan tests for the
validity of the instruments in the differenced and levels equations; Difference Sargan
tests for the validity of the instruments in the levels equation. df denotes degrees of
freeedom. CV DS denotes the critical value for the Difference Sargan (instruments are
reliable if Difference Saran is below CV DS). M1 tests for the absence of first-order serial
correlation in the first-differenced residuals; M2  tests for the absence of second-order
serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. Time dummies are taken into account.
They are not presented for reasons of space. *+ gives the parameter estimate of the
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low-volatility regime, *?+ gives the parameter estimate of the high-volatility regime.
Instruments taken into account: for the contemporaneous differences, for 6> the 4 period
up to 6 period lagged values; for all other variables the 2 period lagged values, except for
the lagged dependent variable. For this variable the 3 period lagged value is used. For the
contemporaneous levels, the one period lagged value of the first difference of all
independent variables, except for 6>. For 6> the 3 period lagged value is used.
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1
 The model draws heavily from the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) model. Sterken and Lensink (2001)
discuss  the original Kaplan-Zingales model, and examine in more detail a stochastic version of
the Kaplan-Zingales model for a risk neutral and a risk-averse manager.
2
 We thank Frank Windmeijer for providing the package of DPD98 including the corrected two
step standard errors.
3
 The Difference Sargan test is calculated by subtracting the value of the Sargan test of a first
differenced GMM estimate form the value of the Sargan test of the system GMM estimate. The
degrees of freedom of the Differenced Sargan test equals the degrees of freedom of the system
GMM Sargan test minus the first differenced Sargan test.
4
 With respect to EMPVOL, we use the value of the lower confidence interval, in stead of the
average value of the threshold,  to compute the indicator function. In case the average value is
used, the GMM estimates did not gave any results due to problems with inverting the matrix that
is needed for the two-step estimates.
6
 As noted by Hansen (1999) this assumption excludes lagged dependent variables from the
model.
